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last year at this time.”  Even if access has 
increased since last year and even if students 
are more likely to have access than non-stu-
dents, these figures suggest that a significant 
number of college students can’t use their 
online library resources from home.  Since the 
conference, I’ve been asking librarian guest 
speakers in my academic libraries course 
about students without home computers. 
Their response has been unanimous: they 
encounter many students for whom campus 
access is the only alternative.
Beyond the campus, the public library 
used to be the great equalizer.  A poor kid 
whose parents couldn’t afford to buy books 
could check them out from the local library, 
take them home, read them, and then go back 
for more.  A voracious reader could at least 
partially overcome the disadvantage of less 
than adequate schools and gain the knowledge 
and skills needed to get into a good college or 
land a good job.  Large public libraries might 
even provide more convenient resources for 
college students, at least for undergraduates. 
While books remain for reading in the public 
library, access to scholarly online resources 
beyond those suitable for high school is less 
likely.  Furthermore, some public libraries 
allow access only to information resources 
and don’t make available the software such as 
word processing and spreadsheets needed to 
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complete assignments.  Finally, according to 
Public Libraries and the Internet 2009: Study 
Results and Findings, around 18% don’t allow 
users to connect flash drives to public library 
computers, so the students can’t store their 
work or information findings for later use.
A digital divide that hinders getting 
educated is especially troublesome in these 
difficult economic times when employers re-
quire more skills and higher degrees.  Detroit, 
where I live, used to be a place where a high 
school graduate could get a job that supported 
a middle class lifestyle.  Manufacturing jobs 
moved abroad, and the remaining ones pay 
much less than they used to.  My university’s 
enrollment is reasonably steady even in these 
tough times because area residents are getting 
more education in hopes of bettering their 
lives.  While upward mobility in America 
has often been more of a myth than a reality, 
America nonetheless needs a better educated 
work force to complete in the global economy. 
Hindering intelligent, talented students whose 
only fault is being poor from accessing library 
resources to complete the assignments that 
will lead to academic success, needed skills, 
and required degrees seems to me a violation 
of the American social contract, if not an 
outright denial of the American dream.
This article has come a long way from the 
optimistic view of the digital future painted 
by Michael Stephens to a gloomy prediction 
of a permanent underclass from the lack of 
computer access and skills.  Michael and I 
didn’t come up with an answer in Charleston. 
I still don’t have one now.  I would suggest 
that all libraries, but especially academic 
libraries, think about those students without 
computers and perhaps more importantly 
without broadband Internet access as they 
implement new services that move away from 
print to digital.  I do have a few suggestions. 
Buy the extra copy of an important book in 
print even if the library already has a digital 
copy.  Make sure that students can download 
to their flash drives even if doing so increases 
security risks.  Have enough fast computers 
somewhere on campus for all who need to 
use them.  Maximize the library Website for 
speedy loading and subscribe to electronic 
resources that do the same in the hopes that 
some students might get by with a dial-up 
connection.  I’m sure that others could come 
up with additional suggestions.  I agree that 
digital is the future of academic libraries, 
but libraries could at least recognize that the 
change has a downside for some users.
I’ll close by confessing why this issue is so 
important to me.  I grew up in a lower middle 
class family where money was tight.  Through 
hard work, scholarships, and the help of public 
and academic libraries, I received a doctorate 
from Yale University and a masters in library 
science from Columbia University.  I’d like 
hard working, intelligent students who are 
unlucky enough to be poor to have the same 
opportunities.  To do so, they need to find a 
way to cross the digital divide.  We should 
take it upon ourselves as individuals and as a 
profession to help them make it.  
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The suit brought on April 15, 2008, by three academic publishers — the presses of Cambridge and Oxford universities 
and the commercial house Sage — against 
Georgia State University is wending its way 
through the legal process of the federal court 
of the Northern District of Georgia, and it 
may be several months yet before any judicial 
opinion is forthcoming.  But the case has 
already included an interesting intervention 
by Columbia professor Kenneth D. 
Crews, well-known to many as a 
frequent lecturer and writer 
on copyright issues and 
the long-time head of 
Indiana University’s 
Copyright Manage-
ment Center in India-
napolis, which produced 
a great deal of very useful 
educational material aimed 
at helping graduate students 
and faculty understand their 
rights and responsibilities under 
copyright law.
The law firm of King & Spalding repre-
senting the defendants in the case commis-
sioned Crews to prepare an “expert report” 
on copyright law and fair use as it pertains to 
the policies and practices carried on at Geor-
gia State, and initially a 72-page document 
was submitted to the court on June 1, 2009. 
After responses were provided by the plain-
tiffs and their attorneys, Crews completed a 
rebuttal, filed on November 2.  These are the 
two documents that will 
be the main focus of 
this article.  They are 







F i r s t  i t  may  be 
helpful to lay out the 
background to this suit, 
briefly.  Concern among 
publishers about the way 
that e-reserve systems were developing in 
libraries, threatening to take the place of 
print coursepacks, began to grow in the early 
1990s.  The first formal effort to reach some 
consensus about how e-reserve systems should 
function took place within the context of the 
Conference on Fair Use (CONFU), convened 
in September 1994 as part of the Clinton 
Administration’s National Information 
Infrastructure Initiative.  (A useful summary 
of CONFU is available here: http://www.utsys-
tem.edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/confu2.htm.) 
E-reserves was one of five topics the CONFU 
participants discussed, but perhaps the most 
contentious, so much so that no recommenda-
tion about it was included in the final report of 
November 1998.
While Crews acknowledges his role in 
the CONFU process as someone who “par-
ticipated in that subgroup” that developed the 
Fair Use Guidelines for Electronic Reserve 
Systems (Expert Report, p. 25), he is being 
far too modest.  In fact, Crews was recruited 
to be the principal drafter of those guidelines. 
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I know because I was the lead negotiator for 
the AAUP in working with Crews to incor-
porate language that would allow the AAUP 
to endorse the guidelines.  (Lolly Gasaway 
was another member of the drafting com-
mittee.)  Foremost among my objectives was 
to have the guidelines recognize explicitly 
that e-reserves were to function in the same 
fashion as traditional print reserve systems, in 
providing supplemental materials for a course 
and not constituting an entire coursepack.  The 
key sentence in this regard is the following: 
“When materials are included as a matter of 
fair use, electronic reserve systems should 
constitute an ad hoc or supplemental source of 
information for students, beyond a textbook or 
other materials.”  (The full text of the Guide-
lines is available here: http://www.utsystem.
edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/rsrvguid.htm.) 
This qualification is what allowed the AAUP 
to add its name to the list of groups endorsing 
the Guidelines (which also included the ACLS 
plus a number of smaller library associations, 
but not the ALA, ARL, or AAP, whose po-
litical positions at the time all were based on 
hopes of winning the battle subsequently in 
Congress).  The judge in the GSU case is prob-
ably not aware of Crews’ real role in CONFU 
and his acceptance of this principle as a reason-
able interpretation of fair use in application 
to e-reserves.  The e-reserve policy as stated 
now at the University System of Georgia’s 
Website (http://www.usg.edu/copyright/ad-
ditional_guidelines_for_electronic_reserves) 
conspicuously omits this consideration of 
e-reserves not substituting for coursepacks, 
although Crews’ own survey of policies in his 
Expert Report reveals this to be included in the 
policies at many other universities, which he 
admits adopted much of the approach taken in 
the CONFU Guidelines.
With the failure of CONFU to produce any 
consensus about e-reserves, publishers contin-
ued to worry and began to monitor practices 
as best they could be determined from Internet 
searches.  I was a member of the Copyright 
Education Committee of the AAP during this 
period, and this group was asked by the AAP 
Copyright Committee to undertake a survey 
of e-reserve policies.  Our research produced 
a report in February 2003 covering 103 insti-
tutions of higher education in 23 states, from 
community colleges through the largest public 
and private universities, and revealed that, de-
spite the refusal of CONFU to adopt them, the 
Guidelines that Crews had drafted had de facto 
become the operating principles for many of 
these institutions, wherever they went beyond 
just a bald restatement of the law’s Section 107 
itself.  It appears that the sentiment expressed in 
the University of Texas System’s summary of 
CONFU was widespread: “the work performed 
by this group presents a valuable starting point 
for institutions wishing to develop their own 
electronic reserve guidelines.”  In his Expert 
Report, Crews summarizes a similar survey 
he undertook, covering 37 institutions in 23 
states.  Although the two surveys only overlap 
to some degree, it was interesting to see that, 
when percentages were provided for amounts 
of material copied, the figure from our 2003 
report was most often in the range of 10% to 
15%, occasionally 20%, but never as much as 
the 25% that appears for a number of institu-
tions in Crews’ survey — which suggests 
that over the past half-dozen years libraries 
have gotten bolder in their assertion of fair 
use with respect to e-reserve practices.  This 
is not to suggest that even the lower figure 
can be taken as a reliable rule of thumb: as 
Crews himself emphasizes, no one factor is 
determinative in any fair-use analysis, and all 
four factors as well as other considerations that 
are relevant in any given case come into play in 
the assessment of what is fair in the particular 
circumstances.
Following upon this survey by the Copy-
right Education Committee, the AAP Copy-
right Committee set up an E-Reserves Task 
Force to which I was appointed.  It began its 
work by reviewing the CONFU Guidelines 
but agreed after lengthy discussions over many 
months to settle for an FAQ rather than another 
set of guidelines.  These have been posted 
since the summer of 2004 here: http://www.
publishers.org/main/Copyright/CopyKey/co-
pyKey_01_02.htm.  The preparation of this 
FAQ was spurred in part by investigations of 
practices at some campuses of the Univer-
sity of California where evidence had been 
uncovered of massive amounts of e-reserve 
copying that the AAP and AAUP considered 
to be well beyond what fair use permitted. 
Subsequent efforts to resolve these problems 
with the counsel’s office for the California 
system proved fruitless.  Greater cooperation 
came later from a number of other universities 
that were approached in 2007 by the AAP, 
including Cornell, Hofstra, Marquette, and 
Syracuse.  Georgia State was among the 
universities the AAP tried to engage in these 
discussions, but it rebuffed every attempt.  The 
suit was brought as a last resort.
It is very important for everyone to un-
derstand why Georgia State proved to be so 
intransigent.  The official copyright policy 
of the Regents of the University System of 
Georgia had been based on an idiosyncratic 
theory promulgated by a prominent copyright 
expert based at the University of Georgia Law 
School named L. Ray Patterson.  This theory 
is explicated in, among other places, the book 
he co-authored with Stanley W. Lindberg 
titled The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ 
Rights published by the University of Georgia 
Press in 1991.  The theory allows for a distinc-
tion between “use of the work” and “use of the 
copyright.”  Use of the work, Patterson argues, 
is a right of “personal use” that copyright law 
must recognize as inherent in the Constitutional 
mandate for copyright to promote learning: 
“the personal-use principle prohibits copyright 
from being used to inhibit a user’s efforts to 
learn” (p. 70).  Use of the copyright, which is 
the proper subject of fair use, pertains to the 
use by a competitor in another publication. 
Since no “publication” is involved in the use 
of a work included in a coursepack or posted 
on an e-reserve system, according to this theory 
there can be no infringement, no matter how 
much material is duplicated. It doesn’t matter to 
Patterson that this “may well enable individu-
als [or, presumably, their proxies in on-campus 
copy centers or libraries also] to make copies 
of copyrighted works instead of purchasing 
them” (p. 157).
Interestingly, the first draft of this book was 
presented in the guise of a “neutral” guide to 
fair use for faculty.  I was a pre-publication 
reviewer of this book for the University of 
Georgia Press and, along with the other re-
viewer, vociferously protested to the Press that 
it was anything but and, if published, should 
be honestly presented as the argumentative 
treatise it really was.  Even though the Press 
followed this advice, the authors nevertheless 
succeeded in their goal of having the Georgia 
System adopt this theory as its official policy. 
I cite as an authority here Crews himself (who 
was, ironically, the first recipient of the L. Ray 
Patterson Award from the ALA in 2005).  In 
Copyright, Fair Use, and the Challenge for 
Universities (Chicago, 1993), Crews observes 
that while he was completing the survey of 
university copyright policies for this book, “the 
legal counsel for the University of Georgia 
replied that the university had no such policy 
and that copyright issues simply were not a 
priority concern for the institution. After the 
closure of surveys…the university issued the 
most extraordinary, the most original, and the 
most ‘lenient’ of all university policy state-
ments.”  He goes on to say:
A committee of faculty, administrators, 
librarians, and legal counsel issued a 
162-page “handbook” and a sixteen-
page set of “guidelines” that survey the 
purpose and history of copyright, that 
outline the structure of the law, and that 
detail the law’s application to numerous 
specific situations.  Two members of 
the committee were professors L. Ray 
Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, 
whose 1991 book tests the limits of user 
privileges under copyright and proffers 
an expansive argument.  The Georgia 
policy is expressly based on their book.  
In accordance with the legal arguments 
of Patterson and Lindberg, the Georgia 
policy identifies generous opportunities 
of  “personal use” and fair use…. 
The Georgia document is the most ambi-
tious statement from any university on 
copyright’s underlying purposes and 
on the law’s implications for specific 
circumstances.  The policy also tests 
the limits of copyright interpretation…. 
Professor Patterson is not known 
for conforming to the latest judicial 
opinions when he can argue that those 
opinions misinterpret the law and 
ignore its historical and constitutional 
foundation. 
Few institutions share the boldness 
of the University of Georgia.  The 
university should be commended for 
avoiding form policy statements and for 
identifying the broadest scope of user 
rights.  The Georgia policy is worthy of 
close study by any university establish-
ing its own standards, but no university 
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should adopt those standards without 
a careful assessment of their full sub-
stantive implications and the possible 
consequences — both the beneficial 
and the troublesome consequences — of 
testing the law’s limits so extensively.” 
(pp. 117-118)
It should be perfectly clear from Crews’ 
own description that the Georgia System’s 
policy was way out at one extreme, being 
the most “lenient” of all university policies 
he surveyed for his book.  In fact, it was so 
extreme that when the Georgia state attorney’s 
office became involved in the case after the suit 
was brought, it was determined that the policy 
would be indefensible in court, and subse-
quently the old policy itself was abandoned and 
a new one adopted in its place.  Patterson may 
not have cared much about “the latest judicial 
opinions,” but the state attorney could hardly 
afford to ignore them in defending its client! 
Probably few people not involved closely 
in this case are aware that the policy now 
being defended by Georgia is not the same 
as the policy in effect when the suit was first 
brought.  And it is this new policy, not the old 
one about which Crews had expressed such 
doubts himself, that is the subject of Crews’ 
own two reports to the court. 
The playing field thus has shifted during 
the course of this case in very significant 
ways.  Because the plaintiffs were not seeking 
damages for past infringements but only an 
injunction against future illegal copying, the 
defendants’ lawyers cleverly sought to avoid 
any responsibility for previous practices and 
at the same time preempt arguments about the 
likelihood of future infringement by changing 
the rules of the game with the adoption of a 
whole new policy and justificatory framework. 
Past actions were moot, they told the court, 
and the University should be judged only ac-
cording to its promised new behavior.  What 
is still very much at issue, however, is whether 
in spite of the new policy the practices have 
actually changed much, if at all.  Crews notes 
at one point that “since the adoption of the new 
policy, the library has reviewed and rejected 
at least one request to copy a large portion 
of a book” (Expert Report, p. 55).  Consider-
ing the massive amounts of copying that had 
been going on under the old policy, this “one 
request” hardly seems like much progress.  Old 
habits die hard.
With this review of past developments 
concerning e-reserves as background, it is 
now time to take a closer look at Crews’ two 
reports.  The first, called the Expert Report, has 
as its main aim an assessment of the new Uni-
versity System of Georgia policy adopted only 
after the publishers’ suit was brought.  This 
report summarizes the growth and evolution of 
e-reserve systems since the early 1990s; traces 
how copyright law, especially fair use, has been 
applied by courts over the past couple of de-
cades; analyzes the limitations of three model 
policies developed for reserve readings (the 
Classroom Guidelines, which were included in 
the legislative history accompanying the 1976 
Copyright Act, the 1982 ALA Model Policy, 
which was adopted by that library association 
in response to the alleged overly restrictive 
nature of the Guidelines, and the CONFU 
Guidelines of 1996); surveys e-reserve poli-
cies in place at 23 colleges and universities; 
discusses common elements of an e-reserve 
policy; and finally evaluates the new policy in 
light of the foregoing review.  Not surprisingly, 
Crews concludes that this policy “is consistent 
with the copyright law of the United States, and 
when followed by instructors, librarians, and 
others at the university, the policy will provide 
an effective means for promoting compliance 
with the law at the university” (p. 69).  He 
further notes that “the policy is consistent with, 
and similar to, many policies that have been in 
place at colleges and universities throughout 
the country” (p. 70).
One reason for this similarity is that the 
Georgia System adopted as part of the new poli-
cy the fair-use checklist that Crews himself had 
pioneered at Indiana University in 1997 (as he 
acknowledges on p. 58) and then instituted at 
Columbia University when he went there in 
2007 to become director of its Copyright Advi-
sory Office.  Crews could hardly fault Georgia 
for practicing what he himself had preached, 
but this certainly makes Georgia’s hiring him 
as an expert a very incestuous relationship. 
It also helps explain why Crews’ evaluation 
of the checklist is very biased and hardly 
“objective.”  While emphasizing elsewhere 
in his Expert Report the situational nature of 
fair-use analysis and the need to be flexible in 
applying it, Crews glosses over what is the 
major defect of the checklist as it is applied at 
Georgia, viz., its highly mechanical deploy-
ment.  The instructions on the checklist itself, 
which faculty are urged to fill out and keep as 
a permanent record to show their “good faith” 
(for the purpose of taking advantage of section 
504(c)(2)’s limitations on liability), begin thus: 
“Where the factors favoring fair use outnumber 
those against it, reliance on fair use is justified. 
Where fewer than half the factors favor fair 
use, instructors should seek permission from 
the rights holder.  Where the factors are evenly 
split, instructors should consider the total facts 
weighing in favor of fair use as opposed to the 
total facts weighing against fair use in deciding 
whether fair use is justified.”  This additive 
method is contrary to the spirit of fair use, and 
Crews should have condemned it.  He knows 
better.  This passage from an article by Robert 
Kasunic in the Columbia Journal of Law & the 
Arts captures that spirit well: 
Only by accepting the value of all of 
the factors will the promise of the mul-
tifaceted approach espoused by Judge 
Leval (and Justice Souter in Campbell) 
become a reality.  No factor is superior, 
nor is any interrelationship of the factors 
dominant.  All of the factors are per-
spectives of the whole picture, and the 
whole picture can only be understood 
by mining all of the information that is 
available from the unique perspective 
of each factor.  The factors are guides 
to intensive fact gathering.  None of the 
factors weigh in favor or against fair use.  
Rather, their cumulative information 
provides the basis for the analysis as a 
whole.  The fair use analysis is not a tally 
sheet, but an examination of the inter-
relationships of the facts and the factors, 
while keeping in mind the primary pur-
pose of copyright. (pp. 115-116)
The full article is available here: http://
www.kasunic.com/Articles/CJLA%20Kasun
ic%20Final%202008.pdf.  It was favorably 
cited by Kevin L. Smith on his blog at Duke’s 
library: http://library.duke.edu/blogs/schol-
comm/2009/08/13/choosing-between-reform-
and-revolution.  Presumably, Smith would 
agree with this characterization of fair-use 
analysis, and I think Crews, if pressed, would 
agree as well.  The Georgia checklist does 
not conform to this way of understanding fair 
use, and Crews should have criticized it in 
this regard.
In his Expert Report, Crews makes much of 
the “one time use is fair use” doctrine, claiming 
that it has operated to raise costs for universities 
because they have not exercised their fair-use 
rights for subsequent uses.  But there is another 
way of looking at this doctrine.  Crews wants 
to argue that there are many good reasons to 
consider subsequent uses fair as well as the 
initial uses, and he blames the widespread 
adoption of this rule on the concept of “sponta-
neity” that was incorporated into the Classroom 
Guidelines in 1976 and later accepted by the 
ALA Model Policy, too.  But one could equally 
argue now that, with the ability to secure many 
permissions now almost instantaneously, this 
rule has outlived its original justification.  The 
origin of this doctrine as a university policy can 
be traced to the University of Texas System’s 
copyright guidelines developed by Georgia 
Harper, which greatly influenced the way 
policies at other universities were written. 
Harper had herself challenged the Classroom 
Guidelines’ interpretation of “spontaneous” as 
far too restrictive when applied to higher edu-
cation, where it could often take weeks or even 
many months to secure permissions.  Hence, 
she argued, first-time use should be fair use 
given the difficulty of obtaining permissions 
quickly, but then permission for use in subse-
quent semesters should be obtained because 
there would indeed be enough time to get the 
licenses needed.  But with the development by 
the CCC of virtually instant permissioning pro-
cesses, this rationale no longer obtains.  Hence 
the real question to raise is not, as Crews would 
have it, whether subsequent uses should be al-
lowed under fair use also, but rather whether 
even that first-time use should be permitted as 
fair use.  Georgia Harper has made this case 
herself in an article titled “Digital Distribution 
of Educational Materials” in which this reveal-
ing footnote appears:
1The recent introduction by CCC of 
its Blackboard tool allowing educa-
tors to obtain and pay for permission 
“instantly” has theoretically eliminated 
the logical justification underlying the 
Classroom Guidelines’ “spontaneity” 
requirement and underlying the claim 
for “first time fair use,” which was based 
on an historically significant time delay 
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in getting permission (weeks, if not 
months).  Before the introduction of the 
instant permissions tool in Blackboard, 
one would evaluate whether a use were 
fair (for example, whether it was the first 
time the professor used these materials 
for this class) before seeking permission 
from CCC.  Now, however, with its 
rationale gone, first time fair use may be 
insupportable.  It seems to make more 
sense to check CCC first and only if per-
mission is not available there, consider 
whether the use might be fair before 
undertaking the still time-consuming 
and potentially unfruitful search for the 
copyright owner.
In explaining how copyright law has 
evolved, in Part V of the Expert Report, Crews 
unleashes the same seductive argument that 
Jonathan Band deployed in his white paper 
on educational use for the ARL, claiming 
that e-reserve and coursepack use could be 
seen as “transformative.”  Hence, on p. 19, 
Crews says: 
In some respects, the use of the materials 
may be transformative.  For example, 
an article in a scholarly journal was 
originally written and published for 
purposes of advancing scholarship.  If 
the article is about medicine, the purpose 
is for advancing medical treatment and 
improving health conditions.  If that 
same article is part of the assigned read-
ing in a course, its use is transformed 
into a teaching tool.  The article may 
be assigned for purposes of advancing 
medicine, but it might also be assigned 
as an example of research methods or 
even to study trends in research funding 
or scholarly publishing.  In an electronic 
environment, the instructor may add 
questions and references for further 
study, and students may add commen-
tary and observations.  In the hands of 
the teacher and student, the article takes 
on a new purpose.
Without repeating all the arguments I made 
in response to Band’s white paper (in “What 
Is Educational Fair Use?” Against	the	Grain, 
v.20#2, April 2008), let me admit that there 
may be a point on the spectrum where “trans-
formative” begins to make sense, as it would 
if a teacher really integrated all the readings 
into some kind of running commentary sur-
rounding them (and maybe this is why the 
Kinko’s judge did not rule out anthologizing 
altogether as beyond the reach of fair use, as 
Crews notes elsewhere in a different context). 
But, typically, the readings are just assigned via 
a syllabus, which hardly offers enough by way 
of “transformation” to qualify as fair use.  It is 
also disingenuous to argue that scholarly work 
is produced just for the “purpose” of advanc-
ing scholarship, and that teaching is a different 
“purpose” altogether for use of scholarly work. 
That distinction flies in the face of all that uni-
versities talk about in promoting the integration 
of teaching and research, and it certainly does 
not correspond with the actual activities of 
academic publishers in making scholarly books 
available in paperback precisely for use in the 
classroom.  There is a real direct impact on the 
market here that Crews glosses over by claim-
ing that “noncommercial” uses are likely not to 
have much impact on “commercial” markets. 
He forgets that 90% of what we university 
presses publish have no other market than the 
academy!  Crews’ attempt to argue for flex-
ibility about determining what amount to copy, 
following on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Campbell, depends on the notion of using 
whatever amount is “necessary” to serve the 
purpose at hand — which is an open invitation 
to instructors to use whatever amount they want 
since they can always justify it in reference to 
the “educational purpose” they have for any 
given assignment.  We would here quickly get 
onto a slippery slope, and what judge is going 
to substitute his or her own understanding of 
“educational purpose” for the instructor’s? 
(It may be worth noting here, though, that 
applying the lessons of Campbell herself in a 
1979 case involving a musical comedy called 
“Scarlett Fever” whose creators claimed it to be 
fair use as a parody of Gone with the Wind, the 
judge presiding in the GSU case found it not 
to contain enough elements to make it overall 
transformative as a work of parody, ruled it to 
have used much more than was necessary for 
that purpose, and — using a functional test 
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developed by David Nimmer to determine 
what is a purpose different from the original 
purpose — held it to be harmful to the market 
for the original.)  At any rate, Crews here goes 
beyond what the Georgia System itself claims: 
the e-reserve policy at the Georgia Website now 
does not currently make this argument about 
“transformative use.”
The Rebuttal Expert Report (hereinafter 
called just the Rebuttal Report) has a more lim-
ited aim than the initial report.  It addresses just 
two questions: 1) is licensing of copyrighted 
works a substitute for the implementation of 
a fair-use standard and policy?  2) does the 
exercise of fair use pose risks to the survival 
of scholarly publishing?  Crews answers both 
questions in the negative.
On the first point Crews argues strenuously 
against viewing licensing as an effective solu-
tion to the problems faced by faculty and ac-
cords it, at best, a partial role in supplementing 
what fair-use analysis should instead provide. 
Rather than try rebutting his arguments myself, 
I defer to Georgia Harper, who took up this 
question in her Connectea blog in July 2007 
where she responded to James Boyle’s essay 
“The Inefficiencies of Freedom” criticizing the 
then new CCC blanket license: 
I’ve read many works by Boyle and 
always find his analysis to be thoughtful 
and thought-provoking….  As a result, I 
was stunned to see that he impliedly la-
beled as irresponsible large universities 
like mine that might consider including 
among the many sources we use to 
provide legal access to educational ma-
terials CCC’s new academic license….  
Somehow this license will 
sweep away all of fair use, 
as though one couldn’t 
thoughtfully conclude that 
paying for permission was 
in many cases the right thing 
to do because a good part of 
what we do is not fair use. 
He easily equated fair use 
for creative uses (parody, 
criticism, commentary) with 
fair use for the massive du-
plication of works created, 
in many cases, just for our 
higher education market…. 
As much as we may dislike the fact that 
the market for permissions and licensed 
works has been held numerous times to 
negatively affect the exercise of fair use, 
that is how the cases involving systematic 
duplication and distribution have gone.  
Further, I don’t believe our not making a 
profit on these copies will completely flip 
the results of those types of cases.
…. Boyle is singling out, as incompat-
ible with fair use, this particular way 
of paying for uses we make of others’ 
works.  He’s afraid that if your univer-
sity just writes a check to CCC for, let’s 
say, $100,000, so that all the works that 
are covered by the license (the “reper-
toire”) can be used in the typical ways 
we use such works in connection with 
classroom assignments without having 
to report how many copies were made 
of which particular works (that is, ef-
ficiently), it becomes easy to ignore the 
question of whether a particular use is 
a fair use.  Who cares whether it’s fair 
use or not?  And Boyle’s concern is that 
if we don’t care about fair use here, fair 
use will disappear altogether.
Sounds logical, except that fair use is not 
a monolithic all or nothing proposition.  
The fair use test comes out differently 
depending on the facts about each use.  
His argument is not that different from 
saying that if we don’t rely on fair use 
to copy an entire book, we’ll lose the 
right to quote a single line from a book.  
Those two things are qualitatively, not 
just quantitatively, different.  Creative 
uses and duplicative, iterative, plain 
old copying and distributing uses are 
very different and the courts have con-
sistently recognized that.
…. These cases [involving Grateful 
Dead posters and Perfect 10’s images] 
say to me that creative uses have a strong 
claim to fair use; even duplicative uses 
without a market for permission have a 
strong claim to fair use.
But duplicative uses where there is a 
functional, efficient market for permis-
sion are not enjoying the same strong 
claim in the courts.  I don’t think the 
courts are going to begin any time soon 
to paint with the broad strokes that Boyle 
fears.  I too believe that we have to draw 
a line in the sand about fair use.
…. I just don’t agree with Boyle about 
which side of the line our 
systematic, massive copying 
and distribution of classroom 
materials falls on.  In theory, 
maybe some time in the past, 
it all, or some large part of it, 
fell within fair use.  But with 
today’s markets for licensing 
and permission, and courts 
that are all over that concept 
when it comes to this kind of 
use, I have come to believe 
that that time has passed. 
There are cases where I still 
feel we reasonably rely on 
fair use for classroom materials, but they 
are a small percentage of all our uses.
Clearly, Crews agrees more with Boyle 
than with Harper.  But as Harper points out, 
Boyle doesn’t have the responsibility she does 
to advise the university about what risks to 
take.  One might say the same about Crews, 
in reference to Georgia, if not Columbia 
University where, presumably, he does have 
the same kind of responsibility that Harper 
did. I wonder if Columbia has refused a CCC 
license on his advice?
In his cost/benefit analysis Crews simply 
ignores entirely the great savings that come 
from a blanket license like CCC’s, which al-
lows for storage of digital files for reuse from 
semester to semester whereas, under Georgia’s 
policy and almost every other one he cites, the 
files must be destroyed at the end of each term 
and reconstituted  again for use in subsequent 
semesters.  Crews also vastly overstates the 
cost and difficulty of centralizing copyright 
clearance services on campus and taking that 
burden off of faculty, who have neither the 
time nor inclination to devote to learning the 
intricacies of copyright law (as we publishers 
have discovered when we observe that aca-
demic authors seldom even bother to read the 
contracts they sign for books and articles we 
publish for them, let alone educate themselves 
about copyright).  I can cite the success that 
Penn State has had with just such a central-
ized service for coursepack copying, which 
operates to insulate faculty from liability also, 
as the University guarantees to protect faculty 
from infringement suits only when they use 
this service and do not go off campus to get 
copying done by commercial copyshops. 
So it is hardly as complicated to coordinate 
copyright permissioning as Crews makes it 
out to be.  Nor do I see why he thinks libraries 
can’t readily charge individual students for 
their e-reserve services; after all, they charge 
them for keeping books out too long, and 
whatever mechanism is used for that function 
could be used to charge e-reserve fees also, 
if the university wants to treat them the same 
way coursepack charges are handled.
Crews further argues that copyshops do not 
have much incentive to apply fair use because 
they can simply pass extra costs of getting 
permissions along to publishers.  But this 
claim flies in the face of the evidence a group 
of publishers uncovered when they joined in 
bringing a series of suits against copyshops 
that did not want to get permissions precisely 
because they could be more competitive in 
pricing with copyshops that did.  Crews’ argu-
ment sounds logical enough, but he cites no 
evidence to back it up.
Finally, I would contest Crews’ argument 
in the second half of the Rebuttal Report that 
fair use has almost nothing to do with the 
threats to scholarly publishing today.  Yes, he 
rightly observes that library purchasing deci-
sions, heavily pressured by rapidly rising costs 
of STM journals (originally in print and then 
later in electronic form) have severely affected 
the market for books published by university 
presses.  And, yes, the “open access” move-
ment has led to new ways of thinking about 
the whole enterprise.  But the reality is that 
income from permissions is not negligible and 
constitutes enough of the revenue stream for 
university presses to keep them from having 
to ask their parent universities for even higher 
operating subsidies.  Indeed, I believe that for 
most presses that income is more than double 
or triple what the income is for eBook sales so 
far.  There is no recognition in Crews’ reports 
that universities that have presses show no 
signs of increasing their subsidy support for 
them, and that universities without presses 
are not willing to pay anything to support 
the entire system from which they benefit, as 
was recommended way back in 1979 by the 
National Enquiry into Scholarly Communica-
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tion.  GSU has, in fact, been a “free rider” on 
this system for years, not even paying its fair 
share of permission fees to support the sys-
tem indirectly. It remains to be seen whether, 
under the revised policy, these payments will 
increase significantly, as they should. 
My own personal view is that the idea 
of “transformative use,” as deployed in the 
Second (not the Ninth) Circuit, holds a lot 
of promise for the way university presses 
should regard fair use, both as users and as 
publishers.  Indeed, many of our presses are 
now using fair use to defend such practices 
as not seeking permission to use film stills in 
scholarly books about that medium of culture, 
which is a classic example of “transformative 
use.”  What we should continue to oppose, 
as basically threatening our continued sur-
vival and as constituting a parasitical form of 
publishing, is the mere duplication of copies 
with no value added, which is what mostly 
happens with coursepacks and e-reserves. 
This is the difference between “creative” and 
“duplicative” types of copying that Georgia 
Harper emphasized in her blog.  Congress, 
unfortunately, opened the Pandora’s box when 
it included a reference to “multiple copies” in 
the language of Section 107, and we have been 
suffering from this ever since.  I have no less 
an authority than Crews himself admitting, 
in his Chicago book, that “despite its deni-
als, Congress was unquestionably changing 
the law” (p. 33).  As Crews explains, “three 
subtle, but important, changes in Section 
107 emerged during congressional reviews 
and hearings: fair use was expressly applied 
to the reproduction of materials; it permitted 
multiple copies for classroom use; and the 
nonprofit character of a use became an ex-
plicit factor in the fair use equation” (p. 32). 
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In fact, the study of fair-use jurisprudence 
that Congress asked the Copyright Office to 
prepare leading up to the revision of the law 
in 1976 revealed that no judge had ever ruled 
that straightforward reproduction of a copy-
righted work for its own sake was a fair use. 
While “multiple copies” are now referenced 
in Section 107 explicitly, we can reasonably 
argue that this should be interpreted in a de 
minimis sense because, as Judge Newman 
famously said in the Texaco decision, what-
ever social utility this kind of copying may 
have, it has nothing to do with what fair use 
traditionally meant: 
We would seriously question whether 
the fair use analysis that has developed 
with respect to works of authorship 
alleged to use portions of copyrighted 
material is precisely applicable to cop-
ies produced by mechanical means.  
The traditional fair use analysis, now 
codified in section 107, developed in 
an effort to adjust the competing in-
terests of the authors — the author of 
the original copyrighted work and the 
author of the secondary work that “cop-
ies” a portion of the original work in the 
course of producing what is claimed to 
be a new work.  Mechanical “copying” 
of an entire document, made readily 
feasible by the advent of xerography…, 
is obviously an activity entirely differ-
ent from creating a work of authorship.  
Whatever social utility copying of this 
sort achieves, it is not concerned with 
creative authorship.
It is anyone’s guess how the GSU case will 
ultimately turn out, and it is not the purpose 
of this article to make any predictions.  Judge 
Evans, presiding in this case, has shown 
herself to be well-informed about copyright 
and respectful of past opinions.  She is no L. 
Ray Patterson, who was actually the defense 
attorney in one of the copyright cases she 
handled in her district in which he was on the 
losing side.  And her interpretation of “trans-
formative use” follows the functional test 
developed by David Nimmer in the authorita-
tive treatise Nimmer on Copyright rather than 
the radically new type of functional analysis 
propagated by the Ninth Circuit in various of 
its rulings over the past several years.  (For 
more about these types of functional tests, 
see my article “Is ‘Functional’ Use ‘Trans-
formative’ and Hence ‘Fair’? in Against	the	
Grain, v.21#3, June 2009.)  While I had ear-
lier predicted that Judge Pierre Leval, who 
is credited with greatly influencing judicial 
thinking about “transformative use,” would 
not find the Ninth Circuit’s decisions to be 
consistent with his own concept, only to be 
disabused by Leval himself when he gave the 
Christopher Meyer Memorial Lecture titled 
“Did Campbell Repair Fair Use?” at George 
Washington University on June 2, 2009, 
Leval in private correspondence subsequently 
did affirm that he does not “read Perfect 
10 as authorizing, or opening the door to, 
free distribution of books to students on the 
grounds that that is a transformative use, all 
the more so when the books are themselves 
of an educational nature.  I rejected virtually 
the same argument in the Texaco case, which 
I had in the district court.  I recall making the 
observation that allowing Texaco free access 
to the scientific publications of the plaintiffs 
on the ground that Texaco was using them for 
scientific purposes would be an appropriation 
of the plaintiffs’ market.”  So, whatever Judge 
Evans may think about the Ninth Circuit 
cases, we may hope that she, like Leval, will 
still reject the kind of sweeping argument 
about “transformative use” that Crews, fol-
lowing Band, puts forward to turn fair use 
into a truly radical justification for merely 
“duplicative” copying.  
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Google Zeitgeist 2009
If you haven’t, check out Google Zeitgeist.  The algorithmic aladdins 
in Mountain View have compiled local lists for the most popular searches 
of select US cities and then ranked them based on how unique these 
searches were for that city.  A search is unique if it is “disproportionately 
popular in a particular city compared to the rest of the country.”
Here are the ten most unique and popular searches in the 
Chicago, Illinois area:
 1. impact cps   6. metromix Chicago
 2. cta bus tracker   7. Harold Washington college
 3. second city cop   8. paws Chicago
 4. rta trip planner   9. Chicago public library
 5. Southdown star 10. uic.edu
The most popular “impact cps” is the grade tracking site for 
Chicago Public Schools.  There are two transportation system 
Websites, a popular blog, a local online edition of the Sun-Times 
newspaper, a local entertainment weekly newspaper, and a local 
no-kill animal shelter.  Interestingly, four sites are higher education sites.
Repeated throughout the city by city accounts are education sites and 
most impressively many library sites.  Admittedly there are also many 
jail sites which bear some kinship with public school grade tracking 
sites (progress through a system!).
It’s difficult to say what the search scientists at Google make of these 
popularities.  It’s probably read as the dominance of the Internet by youth 
(who else goes to school, gets in trouble, and take the bus...).  More practically, 
it illustrates how simple we understand search; and that search is local.
What we need to know, though, is what users search 
when they arrive from Google to the sought after cyber-
place.  And this Google isn’t telling us.  We assume this 
is proprietary and the Zeitgeist here will remain secret 
and protected.  For librarians, however, it is edifying to 
confirm our space is unique, popular, and local.
Your link: http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/press/
zeitgeist2009/cities.html
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